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Generating government revenue is a common objective inprivatization. This paper asks:
what determines privatizag ion prices?Pursuing this query helps resolve the currentcontroversies
at)out the bearing of speed and therole for government actions prior toprivatization. The data,
gathered from primary sources,encompass 361 privatized Mexican companies in 49four-digit
mdustzycodes.The dctenninants of auction privatizationprices are divided into three groups:
(1)companyperformance and industry parameters; (2)theauction process and its requirements;
and (3) the prior restructuring actions takenby thegovernment.Controlling for company and
industry effects reveals the significant impact of thecosts and characteristics of the labor force.
Minority control packages carry large discounts. Auctionrequirements that allow foreign
investors result in higher sale premia, whilerestrictions constraining participation orpayment
forms reduce net prices. The speed ofprivatization substantially influences net prices: thelonger
it takes to put thecompany on the block, the more severe the deterioration in performance,and
the lower the premium obtained. Pre-salereductions in labor force, and particularly thefiring
of CEOs, lead to significantly higherpremiums. Debt absorption, investment, and performance
improvement programs do not increase the netprice, while de-investment measures prove more
beneficial. Overall, the results show increasedpremia for government actions that stimulate






An auction of public enterprises is a standard mechanism forachieving a fundamental objective of
privatizatiort: the generation of goverrunent revenue (see Bolton and Roland[1992) and Maskin (19921).
This paper examines n'ha determines auction prices in privuizatio,s.Three types of determinants are
considered: (I) company and industry characteristics; (2) the auctionprocess and its requirements; and
(3) prior restructuring policies of the government. The analysis ofprice determinants resolves some of
the current controversies about the role of speed of sale and ofgove.rnment actions prior to privatization
(see Laffout [19941, Sachs (1992], Shleifer & Vihny [1994). and Tirole[1991]). This study provides
answers to several questions concerning privatization: I-low is privatization affectedby other residual
claimants of the firm? Do the timing and specifics of theprocess matter? Should the government attempt
to manipulate the auction? What types of prior restructuring policiesare worth implementing? Is speed
a key ingredient precluding further government intervention during the sale? Toaddress these questions
I have created an exhaustive database from primary sources of allcompanies privatized in Mexico during
the period between 1983 and 1992.
The paper is divided into seven sections. Following the introduction, section11 outlines the framework
of the analysis: the government, subject to political and socialconstraints, acts with the hope of increasing
the expected value of a public enterprise. These policy actionsencompass a wide array of restructuring
measures and auction requirements. Section II also frames some of the keyquestions surrounding
privatization in terms of the different groups of determinants of prices.Finally, this part describes the
econometric methodology used in the rest of the study.
Section 111 briefly describes the sample and construction of the database. Thisstudy covers the Mexican
privatl7ation program, which involves 361 companies in 49 four-digit industry codes. The data
encompass company characteristics, bids and bidders in the auction, and all government actions before
and resulting from each privatization. These variables are used to detennine thenet price obtained by the
government and an approximation of Tobin's Q. here termed Privatization Q (PQ).
The fourth section presents a cross-sectional analysis of the data andinterprets the first category of price
determinants: firm and industry characteristics. The results reveal the positiveimpact on net prices of
the finn's past performance in tern of net and operating income,capacity usage, and market share.
Privatization involves the sale of fixed assets along with a labor contract. A labor union'spower.
measured by the number of strikes and the cost of contingent labor liabilities, hasa significant negative
impact on net prices. Industries in which State-owned enterprises (SOEs) produce a large share of total
output carry a premium, reflecting the continuation of favorable regulation and entry barriers, as well as
possible previous underexploitat ion of market power. Finally, in line with findings in related work on
private companies (Zingales [1993)), control leads to large premia for majority blocks.
Section V examines the variables related to the process of privatization and auction characteristics.Net
2prices rose in the second phase of the program (1988-1992) when privatization became a central item on
the governments agenda and the economy underwent a stabilization program. The data show that
companies' profitability and market penetration significantly deteriorate as the sale day approaches.
Longer internal times of sale, defined as the period between the first rumor of privatization and its public
announcement, lead to larger deterioration in performance, resulting in lower premia. The number of
bidders involved in the auction positively influences the price, indicating the relevance of wide
participation and the need to eliminate requirements that decrease bidder involvement. Several of these
requirements are shown to affect PQ negatively.
Section VI examines the role of government actions prior to privatization by analyzing the thirdset of
price determinants: restructuring actions before the sale. Prior policies depend on some of the same
variables that comprise the bidders' price function. Given the endogeneity of prior actions, atwo-stage
process is required to evaluate their final impact on price. In the first stage, discrete or limited dependent
variables methods are used to determine the probability that a restructuring measureoccurs, revealing the
main factors that influence the government's decisions.In the second stage, the predictors of
restructuring actions are used as generated in'ruments to account for the effect of such policies on PQ.
I analyze six areas of company restructuring prior to privatization:management, labor, debt, efficiency
programs, investment, and dc-investment. An evaluation of their final impact on net prices provides
guidelines for dos and don'ts in SOE restructuring. For instance, the results suggest that it is worthwhile
to replace the CEO with a "privatizer" whose task is to clean up the company, to reduce thewaste of
resources, and to get the firm on the block as quickly as possible. Labor downsizing before selling has
a positive marginal effect on PQ, while debt absorption has no impact. Investing or embarkingon
efficiency programs before the sale actually decreases PQ; the government does not get its money's worth
and the performance of the company remains the same, In contrast, cutting the flow ofresources and
postponing large investment programs, or dc-investing, fares better in terms of premiums.
Section VU summarizes the findings. These results shed light on theprivatization process and provide
empirical evaluation of some theories about privatization.
H.PRIVATIZATION PRICES AND THEIR DETERMINANTS
11.4.Methodology andPrivaüzarion Q
Although various national privatization programs outline a multiplicity of goals, a closer look reveals
that most governments pursue two basic objectives: (1)efficiency enhancement, in terms of depolitization
of slate-owned enterprises (SOEs) and improvement ofcorporate governance (see Shlejfer and Vishny
(1994)); and (2) revenue generation, either to get out of fiscal crises or to achieve redistribulivepurposes.
An evaluation of privatizatjon practice alsosuggests that, subject to certain political and social constraints.
3generating government revenue is a fundamental objective. In Mexico. for
example, price was the key
factor in selecting the winner in over 96% of all privatized SOEs.
When all relevant costs of privatization are considered, the nettransaction price is often very different
from the announced price in the sale contract. A failure toaccount for these costs in the price measure
could lead to a significant bias. Adjusting the prices reported in the officialstatistics requires an analysis
of the sale contract and all restructuring costs incurred prior to andconnected to the sale. A measure of
the net price Qbtained by the government for eachcompany privatized. i. is created as follows:
GNPP,=B,-P*R-GC - Adj (I)
GNPP,,or Government Net Privatization Price for company i, is constructed bycalculating the present
value of the nominal sale price as registered in the sale contract(B,) and making the following
adjustments:
(a) subtracting the cost (Pj of the restructuring measures (R,) undertaken by thegovernment before the
sale;
(b) subtracting of the costs of the "Government Commitments and the "Special Clauses'promised by
the government at the time of the sale (GC); and
(c) adding or subtracting of the adjustments made to the sale contract (Ad),), suchas reimbursements
on both sides when the financial statements differ from the ones given to the bidders before the
sale.'







where PQ is defined as Privatization Q forcompany i. PQ considers GNPP as the proxy for market
value of stock. adjusts it by the percentage ofcompany shares sold (sh,), and controls for total liabiljties
(7D,) and total assets (TA,,0) of the firm right before privatization. This allows us to calculate a price
measure similar to Tobin's Q despite the limited data available for SOs.
Several other variations of GNPP were also calculated. First, a more comprehensive GNPP was created including
parameters such as investment commilments made by the bidder and any benellis obtained (or the workers in terms ol shares
or commitments of the bidder not to incur labor cuts. Only 12 cases had formal investment commitmeins of a specific amount
in the sate contract. In another 3 cases, a minoritypercentage of shares, va,ying Irom t to tO%. was given lo the labor union.
The correlation between GNPP and this new measure is 0.9852, A third variation of GNPP subtracts theimplied toss to the
government when winners default on their payments or when contract renegotiations take place. The paper does not use this
approximation in the analysis since this adjustment is an c'-post effect for price determination.
4Like other measures of Tobin's Q. PQ is not free from biases.Linderberg and Ross t198i1 point out
that firms with valuable intangible assets in addition to physical capital tendto have higher Tobin's Os.
An upward bias may also exist since many SOEs experience financial or economicdifficulties, so that
the market value of debt could be below book value. Finally, the idealmeasure for the denominator of
PQ would be the replacement cost of the firm's plant and inventories but this number isavailable only
for 58% of the sample, most of which are privatized in the finalyears of the program. The econometric
analysis of this paper was also performed for this reduced set of observations using the valueof the
replacement cost as the denominator. Since the results do not significantly change, and thecorrelation
of PQ with su:' a measure is 0.837, I kept total assets as the denominator ofPQ.
The estimation of the determinants of privatization prices in the following sectionsconsiders PQ as the
dependent variable of what I call the PQ equation:
PQ = pq(X.A,R1) (3)
where PQ1 for company i is a function ofcompany characteristics (X), including financial and
perfrrmance data, information about the other residual laimants of thecompany (labor, management,
minority shareholders, etc.), and industry, trade and market characteristics. Bids, andtherefore PQs, are
also affected by the auction process itself (A1), includingrequirements imposed in the auction, the number
of bidders and rounds, etc. Finally, in determining theirbid, potential buyers also take into account the
restructuring measures implemented by the government on company I (R,). ThePQ equation allows us
to break down the determinants of auction prices in privatization and thereforeto test some of the main
hypotheses in the privatization literature.
II. B. The Determinants of Privatizaijon Prices
The above framework allows us to analyze some of themain points of the privatization debate in light
of the variables which affect privatizat ionprices. This section summarizes the main arguments shown
in Table I, which classifies the empiricalpredictions about the effects of different determinants of Q
implied by the existing theories and models of privatization.
Company Characterjstj
A public company, like any private firm, is characterizedby a set of contracts with its stakeholders,
including workers, managers and shareholders (Fama and Jensen119831). Labor plays a dominant role
in public enterprises, making uniondealings and collective contracts a significant determinant of
privatization prices (LOpez-de-Silanes et al.[1995)). SOEsoften have excess workers, partly because
public sector Unions place greater weight onemployment increases than do unions in the private sector
(see Freeman and Ichnjowskj [1988)) and becausethey simply are more effective in raising employment
5TABLE I
EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS OF TIlE MAIN THEORIES ABOUT
THE DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATIZATION PRICES
This table classiluen the empirical predictions implied by models tsr the effects tttdiflcrerit determinantseta privatizarlon net prices. The measure ol net price is Privatization Q? the value or the Government's Net Privatization Price (GNPP) adjusted
by the percentage or SOC shares sold plus Total Liabilities of the SOC at the time of pri' tuition, divided by TotalAssets of die SOC at the time iii privalization.
- -
Empirical Predictions Model or Dsecuretical Idea or the Effect on PQ
I, Companyand Indaw-yChancletjsars
Strong and Active UnionsSlrlerfrr&Vishny(1994).Ldprc.dr-&ions'o era!. (1995): Psititic unions try to block Negutive Effect e.. -
Gruvemrusenc panicipatior. Laffo"rr (1994). Ktken to al.fl992); Higher mark-u participation entails nsore nsauket
iii ur.dsslry's output power. uneaplouted martet possibilities, or may i.e associated with naure (avsurabte Positive Effect
rcgularitsn.
Control vs. Revenue Grossman&lIon (IPSO), Shktfru- & Viohny (3994); The 'control' view argues that Higher PQ fur Control Privstisattons residual rights of control are die critical detenninanr or resource allocation.
privarizations l'k*ers& Van-ow (1982).Lqforas S lirole(1993);The 'incentive' view argues No significant dirrerence
privatirarion gains coatse from increased manageriat discipline; dsetefore control should between control and twit he critical In deuenninintg poieen.
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Cola! nat.(1994),KEIthno). (1992);Governmentleamt lsow to tell as rinse are)
yc pe oe
VatyltreLe(1988),Kited it all) 994);Improvesflout ptotpecus.
Lt!eiconainia - -
Caves(1992), Rolron & Roland 11992);Onceprivatization in announced, insproved
saskeholdem' incenaiven boots company perfortssaiace. Management corn about
reputation.
Airtraojt (1984), Wreck1)9%); Privatizacionnews triggers performance deterioration
similar to that 01 finns in foaaneiat distress.
Milgronr(1987);Increases likelihood that sortie bidder perceives the good's value, and
!?"° ,. ..,. - .-...-...-
Office 4Pnvasizaviorr W Vetaezatela (1990). and other ageatcfes: Foreign buyers lersi so
underbid because they do not value all the assets' potential arid preclude potential
donaesric boyem.
Mexican Ranking Privosisadon Comnaioee (1991), and other agencies: Pre-qoatirtearion
of bidden Increase. the quality 01 the auctio,. and gives certainty to the whole
privarisarion program.
Aghion, Hoes & Moore ((992), Ladders 1)992): Reastiions reduce corrupctitioa and
may prevent a bidder from acquiring the WE at its macinured valae.
Positive Effect
Positive Effect



















Solicit & Roland (2992); h,oss of experienced nsanagearwnt. Old management oct to
run die tUns eflaciendy becaoae they need a rsputarion to help them lad a job.
Rotheris to. at (2995); Old management team would has the wrong bunsan capitat to
,
Varrovt- 12986), Kreps and Wilson (1982): 'Use government has rrsore resources so design
social safety net measures. The govervutnens in playing • repeated game with inrpedcct
inromsarion in which 'a caret to develop a reputation (or roughness.
Freeman (2986),Ldpez-dr-Stiaiteset o!.f)995): Public uniona can influence the More of
pohric ins who care about votes; therefore the eniane
Newtsery (1991), BoRon & Roland 0992); SOEs could be financially distressed from
debt borden but Mitt economicatty viable. Debt write-olin with auctions aaaoone to a
!!JE9,19e !.!!? Ita evex...S #?!!c nare
Liken en a1j1994); Anymnsetric infonnarion makes bidders underbid when eaty-to-aolve
bonleneek problenvs are present.
Boycko clot. (1995); Managers have lnccntivet to get resotarcea rot the last time its)
!!5..th rs.
.......- ..
lien!. (199)), Kiktei it a! 1I994):'..Jong.plars.ned and carcAal expansions, especially for
welt-ron WEt..' should take place. TIre investment associated with transfotsning Or
large finns into viable units to improve marching opponunities with bidders.
SitIei/en S Vtslany ((994); The investment might riot lit the winner's ptsn. or die 1° ¶c?i° r.arx tnps ilical cone
Cutting the flow rut resources could dansage the viability of the company.


















Independent Variableslevels. Public union contracts, typically generous by industry standards (Freeman (19861), exacerbate
the role of labor conditions in privatization: there are cases in our sample not only where wages are high.
but where fringe benefits triple the total wage bill. Such high wage levels may result from managers
catering to politicians (Shleifer & Vishny 11994]).
Other stakeholders of SOEs sometimes include private shareholders. Based on the concepts introduced
in Grossman and Hart [1986). privatization schemes may be classified into control privalizations, giving
control rights as well as cash-flow rights, and revenue privatizations, giving some cash-flow rights but
no conire'. In the "control" view of privatization. shared by Boycko et al. [19961, residual rights of
control are the critical determinant of resource allocation, implying higher PQs for control privatizations.
On the other hand, in models based on the 'incentive" view (Vickers and Yarrow [19881), control should
not be critical in determining prices. According to this view, privatization gains come from increased
managerial discipline, so that there should be little difference between control and revenue privatizations.
A comparative analysis of the different forms of transfer and an estimate of their relative prices will
contribute to this discussion.
The AuctionProcess and itsRequirements
Prices in privatization can also result from elements of the privatizalion process itself, such as the
auction mechanism, its implementation and timing, and the order of the companies auctioned. Part of
the literature has emphasized the potential role of a "learning" effect on the part of the authority. If
learning is important, governments may start by pri'atizing companies in competitive sectors, where there
is less room for errors, and wind up with firm in oligopolistic or non-tradeable industries (Galal et al.
[1994)). Other authors, such as Kikeri ci al. 119921, suggest that as privatization and its results become
better known by the public. "credibility'" increases, translating into higher premiums. Similarly, as
suggested by Vuylsteke [1988), macroeconomic stability may affect prices since the firms' prospects
change with such conditions.
Speed or swiftness may also influence sale prices. The announcement, even the rumor, of future
privatization of a company may trigger a change in stakeholders' behavior. Caves [1992] finds that some
to'be-privatized British companies improved their performance before privatization. However, one cOuld
argue that privalization rumors may lead to lower productivity, lower performance, wage increases, costly
liquidations, or the outright theft of assets, analogous to the situation of a firm in financial distress.
Empirical work on the causes of the loss in value of firms in financial distress (Altman [1984) and Wruck
[1990]) includes as explanations: (a) managerial distraction, incompetence, or negligence; (b) foregone
investment opportunities; (c) a drop in demand resulting from aggressive competitors or loss of consumer
confidence; and (d) reluctance of suppliers to extend credit or provida inputs. An appropriate measure
of the length of the process will help discern the benefits of speed in privatization.
The number of bidders and auction rounds are also relevant determinants of auction prices (Milgrom
(1987)). The more bidders, the higher the price will be as a result of more competition and reduced
6danger of collusion. Renegotiation possibilities or several rounds of auction when the bids do not cover
t; minimum price expected by the seller have an impact on the optimal strategies folk1ved by the
bidders. The few precious studies cover the auctioning of oil rights, tax-exempt bonds, and government
contracts (see Gayer and Zirnmermann [1977). Brannman et al. 11984). and Porter (1986)). Privatization
auctions offer the opportunity to look at the effect on prices of bidder participation in a wide range of
industries and among a very diverse group of bidders.
Political concerns may prevent foreign participation in privatization thus favoring dOmestic groups.
Opening the process to foreign bidders should have an effect on prices through increased competition and
a reduction in the scope for collusion, particularly in oligopolistic industries in developing countries
(Laffont [1994]). Other auction requirements, such as bidder pre-qualifications and forms of payment,
also can have an impact on PQ. These restriction will be empirically evaluated in the course of this
paper.
PriorRestructunngPolicies
Someofthemost interesting questions about privarizaton are: What actions cart the government take
prior to the sale to raise the price? Or. alternatively, should the government sell as fast as it can without
attempting to restructure the SOE? Restructuring before privatization can take place at the company.
industry, or country levels, requiring the intervention and coordination of other authorities beyond those
in the office of privatizatton. Specific areas of prior restructuring include: (1) change in management
and/or board of directors; (2) labor cutbacks and worker contract renegotiations; (3) absorption of either
outsiders' debt, cross-liabilities among SOEs, or past-due fiscal debt; (4) aid programs aimed at
improving the firm's performance; (5) investment measures in the form of rehabilitation plans.
agreements on financial restructuring tied to operation improvements, or a temporary reopening of the
plants; (6) dc-investment, or cutting the flow of resources; (7) legal restructuring, including the solution
of legal disputes or the creation of paten's and/or operation permits; (8) changes in domestic regulation,
trade barriers, or entry and exit rules; and (9) asset restructuring in terms of spin-offs. break-ups, or even
packaging of companies for the sale.
International agencies, valuators, bidders, and government officials around the world advocate the use
of some of these measures in order to raise sale prices. For example, Kikeri et.al. [1992) suggests using
various restructuring policies according to size and industry structure. Tirole's [1991) discussion of
monopoly break-ups hints at investment and rehabilitation programs linked to competition-oriented
restructuring. Although these and others have suggested the use of specific procedures under certain
contingencies (see Frydman and Rapaczynski (1991a1. and Newbery (1991]), there is no systematic
research on the subject. This paper assesses the final impact on PQ of prior restructuring by focusing
on the first six groups of measures: management, labor, debt, efficiency-improvement programs.
For more detailed deSripLi0n ol ihee polick% ee Appendix C.invesrujent prorams. and de-investment measures.
Management shake-ups before privatization may be the cause of lower premiums if the loss of
experienced management results in declining performance and diminished market penetration (BoRonand
Roland (19921). On the other hand, getting rid of the old teammay actually improve results or reduce
the financial squandering often associated with public enterprises: Additionally, the old
managers may
he flawed because they were good at dealing with politicians and not atfacing competition and market
conditions (see Barheris et al. (l996J).
A fundamental difference between public and private sector collectivebargaining lies in the fact that
unions can influence the future of politicians through electoral votes (Freeman[1986]). An argument in
favor of government intervention in labor restructuring as away of boosting privalization prices depends
on the fact that governments also have more mechanisms than the private sector to assist workers
displaced by structural changes: including retraining programs, job search assistance, andseverance
payments (Yarrow (1986]).
If the govciment considers absorbing debt, it shcijld do so witha higher probability when the
company faces large financial costs or is on the brink of bankruptcy. The common argument for such
a policy claims that absorption is needed to ensure the company's viability. One could differentiate
between firms in economic distress that have only negative NPV projects, and thoseSOEs that, although
financially distressed from the burden of debt, still have positive NPV projects. Theliquidation of the
latter firms is inefficient (Newberry [1991)). Alternatively, biddersmay not benefit from debt absorption
if borrowing conditions are better once they are in possession of theasset.
A fourth group of restructuring policies includes programs aimed atimproving the performance of the
SOE before privatization. Upgrading efficiencymay solve the main problems of the SOE. improve
performance, and result in a higher privatization price, particularly if there exist informationasymmetries
between the government and the bidders.
The implementation of investment programs in SOEs is sometimesa response to political constraints
imposed by pressures created by the possibility of shutdowns creatingunemployment, or by the nei to
support sectors that supply basic goods or services. Additionally, according to Tirole 11991), substantial
amounts of investments are required to transform monopolistic companies and break theminto
independent units before privatization. The argument against investment in SOEs before the saleholds
that it is unlikely that the government will invest more wisely just beforeprivatization, or that the buyer
might achieve the same result at the same cost, but more in accordance with herpreferences. This
argument implies that de-investing, or cutting the flow of resources and canceling investmentprograms,
may produce either a zero or a positive result in terms of PQs generated.
SII. C. Estimation Procedure of the Effects of Prior Restructuring Policies on PQ
The government may attempt to raise privatization prices by tryingtorestructure the SOE before tue
sale, Its strategy may be endogenous, reflecting the company's and the industry's Iraits, To take account
of (his endogeneiry, this paper uses a two-stage process to evaluate the impact of prior restructuring on
PQ. The first stage estimates probability of a restructuring measure (R,), while the second stage estimates
its impact on PQ. in the first stage, officials settle on the policies some of which take the form of a
binary choice, for example whether to fire the CEO or to renegotiate the collective union contract. Other
actions entail choice of levels, for example the amount of company debt to absorb. For the binary case.
one can think of an unobserved linear "latent variable," r',, for company i as:
= z,OL+iz . (4)
which depends on a vector z1 of observable company and industry characteristics and on an unobservable
In this framework, r, represents the government's perceived benefit from engaging in action k and
determines the values that the observed dependent variable can take:
=1 0 if zO i- p < 0 5)
I /if z,'O +￿ o
In this case, the estimation procedure uses a Frobit model where the probability of taking a"t action k on
company i is the usual P(r=I) = P(z1O￿i) = 4'(z,O). with '(.) as the distribution function for the
standard normal. Maximizing the log likelihood function with respect to O gives consistent and efficient
estimators and unveils the significant factors considered by the government in undertaking a given
restructuring policy. Regarding policies requiring a choice of levels, such as the percentage of workers
to fire before privatization. the estimation uses limited dependent variables with a tobit model censored
from below at 0 and from above at I.
I use four main groups of variables in the first stage to determine the probability that the government
restructures before privatization:
(I) Agent banks in charge of organizing the auction:
A total of nine different financial institutions were involved as agent banks and were dummied for
in the regressions. The three largest domestic commercial banks handled close to 40% of all
privatization transactions. The agent banks were responsible for obtaining the SOE's information.
suggesting restructuring measures, and organizing the auction itself. As a result, some prior
restructuring policies are associated with certain banks. These dummies have very low correlation
with PQ and are close to a randomly assigned instrument, since the government did not seem to
follow any pattern assigning SOEs to agent banks.
(2) Ministries in control:
Different ministries account for differences in efficiency, bureaucratic hurdles, or simply in the
willingness of certain politicians to adopt specific measures. This set of six dummies has some
9industry correlation but also shows a level of randomness in the classification of SOEs across
ministries (sometimes refleciing political considerations during different administrations). Over
50% of privatized SOEs were classified under the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of lndusry
and Trade, for example.
(3) Predetermined company characteristics or sample-relative parameters:
Relative size of labor force, or assets within the whole population of SOEs, could influence the
government's decision to restructure but should not have a direct effect on PQ. In fact, the relative
size variables used here are correlated with the adoption of some prior restructuring policies, while
their ascocialiorl with PQ is very weak.
(4) Years or periods:
Certain restructuring measures may have been undertaken at different times according to changes
in budget constraints during recessionary or expansionary years. Similarly, restructuring policies
may have changed between different administrations.
Bound el al. (1993), Nelson and Startz [1993), and Staiger and Stock [1993) have shown that a weak
-orrlation between instruments and thc endogenous variable instrumented produces large siandrd errors,
,hich in the presence of even a small correlation between the instruments and the error of the second
stage give rise to inconsistent l.V. estimates. Additionally, the presence of a finite sample bias makes
the magnitude of the IV. estimates' bias approach that of the OLS estimates as the instrumentsare
weaker. Consequently, I calculate the F-statistics on the excluded instruments in the first-stage
regressions. Results show that consistency and finite sample biases are unlikely to be problems in this
paper.
in the second stage, instrumental variables are used to estimate the PQ equation which includes the
restructuring policies. In this step, the policy predictor, , obtained in stage one is used as a genera/ed
instrument to account for the final impact of the policy on PQ. Newey (1984) shows thatsequential
estimators can be interpreted as members of a class of method-of-moments estimators,facilitating the
derivation of asymptotic covariance matrices for two-step estimators. This approach, applied here for the




In March of 1992, the Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SI-ICP)granted me
authorization to review all privatization files in their archives. I also obtained data from theMinistry of
Trade and Industry (SECOFI), the Underministry of Finance and Public Credit, the FederalTreasury,
the Mexican Stock Market. several bidding companies, and some already privatized SOBs. Additionalsources include government statistics and publications, stock market data and reports. Central Bank
Statistics, journals, and newspapers.
Most of the data was collected front primary sources.It covers 361 companies privadzed between
November 1983 and June 1992, accounting for over 98% of all privatized Mexican companies up to that
time. The database contains detailed information about the SOE being privatized, the auction process,
the bids and the bidders. The documentation coded ranges from internal memoranda between government
officials to technical and financial evaluations of the SOEs. The information is classified into the
following :ategories:
I) History of financial and production variables: usually for the three to four years prior to
privatizalion. The information includes data from income and expenditure statements, the general
balance sheet, production, and installed capacity records.
2) Oii'nership structure: before and after privatization. and any changes made during the four years
before privatization.
3) ''thor data: number of unionized nd non-unionized workers, union's type and affi'iation.
description of the collective contract, wages, workers' relations, and number of strikes.
4) Management and board of directors: number, composition, and ownership. They are classified
as bureaucrats, experienced bureaucrats (over three years in the job and/or some qualifying degree),
private sector managers, shareholders, and foreigners.
5) Technology: technology contracts with third parties.
6) Market share: includes percentage of domest.c market, and exports.
7) Industry characteristics: type of competition. industry concentration, entry/exit barriers.
international trade characteristics, and industry regulation (foreign investment, price controls,
special government programs. etc.)
8) Government's involvement: reasons for and degree of presence, type of government company in
terms of control, ministry in charge, and reasons for privatization.
9) Restructuring before privatization: all actions undertaken by the government after privatization was
announced and before the sale. The costs of the measures are also available in most cases.
10) The auction process: auction steps and requirements, iounds of sale, and the number of bidders
involved.
I) Technical and financial evaluations of the company: usually made by the agent bank in charge of
the sale or by a consulting firm. The main problems and advantages of the SOE are determined
based on these documents and some additional sources.
12) Bidders: classified according to their nationality, the industry in which they operate, and their
relation connection to the privatized SQE.
13) Bids: their value, characteristics, terms, conditions, requests, and commitments offered. An
implicit valuation of the cost of these conditions was also sometimes undertaken, based on the
evaluation of the agent bank in charge of the sale.
14) The sale contract: With an evaluation of its terms and conditions, such as government and buyer
IIcommitments.
15) Post-sale adjust inents: including the costs or benefits from a post-sale financial evaluation of the
company, as well as those cases where winners defaulted or renegotiations took place.
The data set consists of a cross-section panel containing data for each SOE for the four years prior to
its privatization. Table II shows the distribution of SOEs sold each year. The number of companies or
legal entities being privatized and the number of transactions differs because some companies were
associations of enterprises or conglomerates or were put together in packages for privatization purposes.
Although 36! companies were sold, involved only 236 transactions or "Privatization ContractS". Out of
these contracts. I found available information for 221. Each Privatization Contract is treated as a single
unit in the analysis.4
II!. B. The Privatiza:ion Program in Mexico
The Mexican privatization program is one of the largest in the world in terms of number of companies
privatized and their relative sizes. In 1982, there .iere 1,155 SOEs in Mexico in almost all sectors of
the economy. Thai year. subsidies and transfers to SOEs equalled 12.7% of GDP. Their output
accounted for 14% of GD?, they employed 4.4% of the country's labor force, and represented 38% of
fixed capital investment. LOpez-de-Silanes (1995) undertakes a comparative analysis of the relative
performance of SOEs to-be-privatized and private firms during the 1980s. He finds that, on average, the
privatized SOEs were money-losing operations, showed higher debt to assets ratios, had lower liquidity,
and relied heavily on short-term debt. Since the SOES to be privatized were chosen by the authorities
because of their potential to be profitable or viable businesses, the performance comparison can be
thought to represent an upper bound for the whole SOE sector in terms of profitability.
In 1983, under large fiscal pressures, a new administration undertook a "Restructuring Program of the
SOEs" with the aim of increasing efficiency. This program involved restructuring measures for some
SOEs and a "clean-up" of the SOE sector through four main mechanisms: liquidation, merger, transfer,
and sale (privatization). Figure 1 shows the reduction in the number of SOEs by year. In the first years
of the program, the number of SOEs was greatly reduced, mainly through liquidation and mergers.
Privatization did not truly take off until 1985. By the end of 1988, the new administration had moved
away from restructuring and towards privatization. In June of 1992, the number of SOEs had been
reduced to 225, and 36! SOEs had been privatized using sealed-bid auctions of control packages. The
The Iwo main reasons for the lack of information are: (I) 8 transactions with private majority shareholders, whh lack
many details of ihe process and information about the company itself: and (ii) 7 cases that either lick all financial statements
and production information, or bidders and bids data, or the sale contract.
Lopcz-de-Silanes (1995c) studies all bids (totalling 839). winners and ioers, and associates bidder characteristics lo bid
pries.
12largest firms and the most complex cases were sold under the Salinas administration slatting in 1989.
The average size of SOE sold in 1988, measured in constant 1992 US dollars. increased two-fold in 1990,
Il-fold the following year. and over 21-fold in 1992. Table Ill groups privatization contracts according
to three-digit industry codes with selected important four-digit industry codes shown. The span of the
program across industries is evident, ranging from commercial banks and steel conglomerates to sugar
cane mills and one of the most popular soccer teams.
Table II







Sample Receipts as a
percentage of 1992's
GDP.
1983 4 2 I 0,00064%
1984 3 1 1 0.00065%
1985 32 tO 9 0.05283 %
1986 30 16 II 0.03015 %
1987 22 Il 14 0.07"30 %
1988 66 51 51 0.40936 %
1989 37 29 29 0.22178 %
1990 91 63 63 1.18034 %
1991 65 37 32 2.91338 %
6/1992 II 10 10 1.71318 %
Total: 361 236 221 6.59262 %
By the end of the sample period, total proceeds from privatization amounted to close to 6.6% of 1992
GDP,with 91% of that collected during the Salinas years (Table II). The proceeds are actually small
if we consider that privatized SOEs representedover 15%of the country's fixed investment. With the
country's value of capital stock close to twice that of GDP. the value of the sold SOEs should have been
close to 30% of GOP. One potential explanation for this finding could be that state-owned capital is quite
unproductive.
III. C. PrivatizationQ(PQ),theDependent Variable
Somecharacteristics of the dependent variable of this study are shown in Table Ill. The mean PQ for
thewhole sample is 0.5377. or 54 cents on ihe dollar, with a standard deviation of 0.79. An initial
13TABLE Ill
PrivatizationContracts according to Industry Classirication
This iabk clasities Privatization Contracts across industries according to three-digit s.i.c. with selected important four-digit
industry codes also shown. BQ is the present value 01 the nominal price adjusted by the percentage of shares sold, plus Total
Liabilities of the SOE at the lime of privacization all divided by Total Assets of the SOE at the lime of privatization). PQ is the
value of the Governments Net Privatization Price (GNPP) adjusted by the percentage of shares sold plus Total Liabilities at the
time of privatizalion, divided by Total Assets of the SOE at the lime or privatization. Both BQ and PQ are the mean values for
each industry group shown.
Industry Code Number of
Contracts
Industry BQ PQ
2320 6 Mining of Metallic Minerals 0.7670 0.6016
2920 7 Mining of Non-metallic Minerals 1.3832 1.1 I I?
3112 4 Milk Products 0.8693 0.6971
3113 4 Fruits and Vegetables 0.8793 0.8793
3114 12 Canned Fish and Seafood 0.6264 0.2925
3115 9 Grains and Oils 0.8511 0.7472
3118 29 Sugar 0.7975 0.7488
3122 10 Animal Foods 0.6746 -0.1333
3130 2 Beverages 0.8656 0.8656
3140 3 Tobacco 0.9195 0.9195
3210 8 Textiles, Clothing, and Leather 0.4409 0.1008
3311 4 Wood and Wood Products 0.3885 -1.4636
3410 4 Paper and Printing 0.6021 0.5980
3500 20 Chemicals. Oil Derivatives, and Plastics 0.9591 0.7691
3600 8 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.5358 0.1885
3700 21 Basic Metals and Derivative Products 0.4694 0.0667
3820 7 Heavy Machinery and Equipment 0.7743 0.73 15
3830 5 Machinery and Equipment 0.6972 -0.1836
3840 II Automotive Industry 0.6039 -0.0084
3842 2 Transportation Equipment 0.9331 0.7751
6310 6 Hotels and Restaurants 0.9654 0.7727
6400 7 Laud and Sea Transportation 0.8352 0.6148
6440 3 Air Transportation 0.9534 0.3789
6520 I Communications (Telephone services) 1.3398 1.3297
6600 18 Commercial Banking 1.1481 1.1188
6610 4 Insurance. Warrantor & Brokerage services 1.2310 1.2825
6900 4 Real Estate & Other Professional services 0.4937 0.5730
8000 2 Recreational and Entertainnient services 1.2169 0.9057
221 Total Sample 0.798) 0.5377finding is that when all relevant costs of privatIzation are taken into consideration, the net price of the
transaction is much less than the announced price in the sale contract. Adjusting the prices reported in
the official statistics requires a significant amount of information, an analysis of the clauses of the sale
contract, and the calculation of the restructuring costs incurred by the government prior to and connected
to the sale.5 To get an idea of the cost of the adjustments and restructuring, Table Ill also shows the
mean value of BQ for each sector, equivalent to PQ but substituting GNPP with "B" (the present value
of the nominal price in the sale contract). The mean BQ for the whole sample was 0.7981. This means
that adjustment and restructuring costs totalled 32% of the net present value of the nominal price in the
contract. Takng account of these costs is essential in ;tudying privatization for two main reasons: (1) the
correlation between GNPP and B is low (close to 0.6), which implies that ignoring restructuring costs
could lead to significant biases; and (2) the amount of resources spent by the government in prior
restructuring is so large that it becomes essential to find out whether such policies increase net prices.
the subject of section VI of this study.6
IV.PQ ANDCOMPANYCHARACTERISTICS
Havingdefined the price measure, this section studies its relation to company and industry
characteristics. Appendices B and C provide definitions and summary statistics for the variables used in
the study. The econometric analysis uses 166 of the 221 available privatization contracts due to the
unavailability of some variables for some of the observations. All PQ regressions present OLS estimated
coefficients with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity according to White [l9801.
The dates in which all these expenses were incurred varied widely, therefore all peso quantities arc transformed to both
constant pesos and constant U.S. dollars as of December 1992.
For comparison, an additional price sianijardizalion is also calculated as follows:
GNPP./sh. GNPP./E. =" TA-TD
.1.10 LII
where GNPP/E cakes GNPP adjusted by percentage sold hut this lime normalized by total shareholders equity deruned as the
difference of total assets and total liabilities at the time or privatizalion (It). The mean GNPP/ is 0.5868 with a standard
deviation of 1.22. Other standardizations calculated include GNPP as numerator with the Following denominators: (i) toutassets
before privalization: (ii) average tour-year sales: and (iii) twoyear average employment. Their correlations with the equity
denominator arc between 0.5356 and 0.6384. The same economeiric analysis of the following pages was also carried out for
the GNPP/E measure as dependent variable without signil'icant changes in the results.
As an alternative, all regressions in the paper were done using GLS with no significant change (not shown). Ouilicr and
points with high leverage were excluded From the sample and regressions were rerun with no significant effect. Similarly, no
significant change is observed when the econometric analysis included all 221 Privatizalion Contracts bul omits the restricting
labor characteristics. Throughout the rest of the paper I use labor force characteristics in the analysis as they account for an
increase in the overall adjusted R5 of between 0.06 and 0.09.
14IV. A. Financial and performance parameters
Financial and production characteristics of the company are divided into four groups: profitability,
activity level, liquidity, and leverage. Table IV presents the main results of a series of cross-section
regressions done for different groupings of company characteristics with and without industry dummies.
Throughout the paper we will use Regression I of Table IV as the Basic Regression, which identifies
company and industry characteristics as well as auction parameters that significantly affect Privatization
Q. Since PQ controls for debt-to-assets ratios, leverage measures are excluded from the independent
variables. Liqt.aidity measures were not significant ii' most cases (not shown in table). All regressions
in Table LV yield large, positive and significant coefficients for profitability ratios (average net income
over sales and average operating income over sales). For example, a I % increase in the net income over
sales ratio translates into an almost 2% increase in PQ evaluated at the mean.
Regression II in Table IV shows a positive, although not significant, relation between PQ and activity
proxies such as the average capital utilization and the average rate of production growth in the period
prior to sale. Capacity utilization has a positive coefficient, suggesting that installed capacity usage
reveals in part the condition of the equipment and its eApected profitability under private ownership.8
IV. B. Industrycharacteristics
Market structure and regulation in a particular industry may play a role in determining privatization
premia, In some industries, the government has a large percentage of the market through a single SOE;
several monopolies and oligopolies (e.g., airlines, telecommunications) fall in this category. In other
sectors, although the government operations supply a large percentage of the market, each of the many
plants or SOEs has only a small share of the market (e.g., sugar mills, animal foods, commercial
banking). The results in Table IV show that the government's overall market participation influences PQ
much n-tore than the individual company's share does.
Part of this result could be explained by government regulation and protection against foreign
competition. For example, the correlation between the percentage of government's share of the industry's
output and a dummy equal to one if there is a special regulation in that sector is O.6327. Although
privalization usually entails industry deregulation,protection from competition is usually slowly
eliminated. In fact, several of these industries face price and quantity restrictions; deregulation tied to
8 Some evidence pointing in this direction is basedon the low correlation, o&y -0.0749, between installed capacity
utilitation and a dummy equal to I i the evaluation or the firm detected problems of old or obsolete machinery, or lack of
investment and maintenance. Meanwhile, the correlation of installed capacity utilization and a dummy equal to one if the
evaluation detected good conditions nt property, plant, and equipment was 0.126.
Meanwhile, the correlation between the government's parikipation in an industry and the percent of foreign ownership
allowed in the industry is -0.1217.
15TABLE IV
COMPANY CIIARACTERISTICS AND TIlE AUCTION PROCESS
Ordinary least squares regresaions or thecross sectjotsni SUEs pro-allied itsMesicobetween 1983 and1992. The dependent variable is
"Privasization Q." the Government"s Privatiration Price tGNPP) adjusted by the percentage of shares sold, plus Total Liabilitiesat time of privatuzasmn divided by Total Assetsofthe Cossspany it time of privatization. "Net Incotne/Satcs"and 'Operating Ineotne/Sales"are the ore-
prsvalizatissn four-year averages of Net Income over Total Sales and Operating Income over Total Sales respectively; 'Growthin Producjn"
iv the pre-privacizat ion (our-year geometric average ot'productiott growth; "Capacity Utilization" is the two-yetr average ofcapacity utilization helsare privatization; "Contingent Labor Liabilities per Worker" is the average cost of firing a worker the day after privatizatson; "Numberol Strikes" is the number of strikes in the five years Isetore privatization; "Government in Industry" is the government"1percentage share In the industry'soutputbefore privatization; 'Non-control Package dummy" equala I when the percentage sow does not give control to the
bujerand oodserwise; "Company Market Share" is the three-year average market share of SOEbeforeprivatization;"Non-iradeable Good dummy equals
I if the main product or the company is a non-tradeable good and 0 otherwise; "Percentage Sold' is the percentage of shires soldis privatization."1988-1992 dummy" is equal In I when the 5013 was privatized between 1988 and 1992 and0 otherwise; 'Total LengtlC is the
titLat number of days between Ihe first recommendation to psivatize and the pruvatization date; "Number of bidders" is the number of different
bidders involved in privatization; "EDt allowed dummy" is equal to I if the toreign investors are allowed into participate inthesale; 'Cash-sate
nuttyduntnty" is equal to I if the privatiration payment had lobe made in cash. White (1980' corrected standard errors are given in parentheses
Drpevsdeni Variable:Prlvatlaatlon Q
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.4619privatization could allow companies to increase prices. The correlation between the percentage of
government's share of total production and dummies for the existence of price and or quantity
deregulation tied to privatization are 0.58 and 0.62 respectively. Alternatively, industries previously
dominated by government operations may in fact be those with the highest potential to exploit benefits
when opened to private ownership. One can therefore expect a premium to be paid for SOEs in such
industries regardless of the relative share of a particular firm at the time of its privatization. since that
share may reflect other factors, such as the government assigning production among plants following
criteria other than profit maximization, for example.
Finally, in contrast to some of the literature on the relevance of international trade characteristics of
the industry (World Bank [1992)), this study finds no significant difference between tradeable and non-
tradeable goods sectors in terms of PQ (regression Ill of Table IV). Other trade measures such as the
share of exports in company sales and the degree of import competition in the market are not significant
(not shown in tables).
IV. C. Labor
Privatizationwinners not only buy the physical capital of the company, they also acquire a labor
contract. Icreated two measures that capture the cost of' the labor contract and the strength of the union.
To measure how much it would cost to fire a worker, I calculate the "contingent labor liabilities per
worker," equal to the cost of firing the average employee if the new owner decides to do so the day after
buying the firm.'0 The second labor measure I use is the number of strikes experience by the SOE in
the five years before privatization. This number is associated with the pugnacity of the union and serves
as an index of labor-management relations. The correlation between contingent labor liabilities per
worker and the number of strikes for the sample is -0.0688. indicating that a combination of these two
variables is needed to cover complementary aspects of the labor situation of the firm. Supporting
Freeman's [1986] evidence on the relatively lower frequency of strikes by public versus private unions,
SOEs to be privaized suffer very few strikes before privalization. No strikes occurred in 55.6% of the
sample, while 44.4% experienced between I and 4 strikes.
The results in all regressions of Table IV (and the following tables) show a negative sign on both the
labor variables." The coefficient on contingent labor liabilities suggests that SOEs where an average
worker costs twice as much as the mean cost have a 3% lower PQ. One of the most striking results is
that an additional strike in an SOE leads to a 18% reduction in the net price evaluated at the mean
'° To compute this number. I include the benelils specified in thc collective union contract. Onaverage, when a public
seclor worker is fired, these benetits take the rorm ot: (I) an average or 3 months or salary: (2) 201040 days or 'vacalions
bonus; (3) 15 to 20 days or salary tor each year the worker was employed; and (4) a special bonus which varied across SOE.s
and ranged between t and 5 months or wages.
The adjusted R increases close 100,09 when I include these Iwo labor variables.
16predicted PQ.' Labor factors play a central role in explaining privatization prices.
[V.0. Control versus Revenue Pris'atiations
Privatization may involve a change in control. As already mentioned, several theories bear on the
relative merits of control and revenue privatizations. To address these issues, I created a "Non-control
Package" dummy identifying the cases when the sale did not include control. A total of 29 observations
falls in this group and all refer to government joint ventures in which private firmscontrolledof the SOE
before privatization. Various performance measures 4or this group are above the average of the rest of
the privatized firms. But all regressions in Table IV show once we control for performance, non-control
privadzations face a statistically significant and economically large discount. Non-control packages bring
net prices equivalent to 25% of those generated by similar packages of shares which do give control
rights to the buyer. This result shows a significant premium for obtaining control versus becoming a
minority shareholder in an already privately-controlled firm.
Regression IV in Table IV uses the same specification as in the Basic Regression but includes the
subsample of control privatizations only. The results show that the percentage of shares privatized is not
statistically significant. This evidence makes clear that a significant premium is obtained for the
privatizacion of majority holdings which give the buyer control; once control rights are sold, the actual
percentage of shares privatized does not affect prices.'3
IV.E. Period.Order, and Learning Effects
Macroeconomic conditions could play an important role in determining PQ. In the first phase of
privatization (1983-1987), the government emphasized restructuring the public sector. Large restructuring
packages covering investment, debt absorption, and company productivity commitments were signed in
this period. The next phase of the program (1988-1992) started not only with a lasge macro stabilization
package, but also with a shift of privatization to the center of the economic agenda. The government
created art Office of Privatization with broad powers and strong support from the President. As an
illustration, internal files of the administration show that the question directed to different ministcies
shifted from which companies should be privatized to which SOEs should remain public and why.
All regressions in the paper were also run excluding the live outlying observations with the highest number of strikes
without observing any significani changes in the results.
IS A final point of debate in this area is that of partial privalization or the case when the government Stays is a partner.
Kikeri et ii. 119921 suggest the idea of keeping a 'golden share' for government in some special cases when political cOncernS
would otherwise prevent privatization. In my sample, the government kept a minority share in eight SOEs making clear its
intention to sell the stock to Use private sector in later offerings through the stock market. The econometric specifications
exploring joint-ventures with the government, show a positive coefficient with ve,y large standard errors. It is haid to interpret
this coefficient in my sample since in most of these cases, die government gave its young rights to die control group. These
results are not shown in the paper hut are available upon request.
17To test the hypothesis of the difference between the two periods, all regressions inclu3e a dummy
variable equal to one for those companies privatized between 1988 and 1992 and 0 otherwise.MI
regressions in Table IV, and throughout the rest of the paper, show a positivecoefficient on the ' l98i-
1992" dummy with a 1-statistic around I. Evaluated at the mean, a company sold duringthe second
phase is priced between 20 and 25% higher than those privatizedbefore 1988. This result could be




Studying different measures of the time spent on the sale of each SOE givesevidence on the benefits
of speed in privatization. To capture this effect, I first construct a variable labelled "Total Length,"which
represents the number of days between the date of the first documentwithin the government that mentions
the possibility of privatization of an SOE and the aate of the announcement of the buyer.The
stakeholders of the SOE likely learned the news of privatization around the date of the first memo.When
I introduce this variable in the first regression of Table V. I find evidence of a significant discount for
onger privatizationS.
To determine the causes of this premium for speed, total length is divided into two subperiods (detailed
in Appendix A). Public length (from the date of the first public announcement until the date of the sale)
proxies for the effect of slow "public sale time," which typically means that several auctionrounds were
needed because either the government did not accept the bids or no bids were registered in the first
round. One might expect the worst companies to have longer public length and possibly end up with a
lower relative price, Instead, regression II in Table V reveals that public length is not the factorwhich
Leads to lower prices, pointing to the absence of a penalty for those companies with several auction
rounds.
internal length is defined as the number of days from the date of the first memo suggesting privatizatiOn
of an SOE to the date of the first public announcement. This number may be related to the efficiencyof
It is also conceivable that the experience gained through lime could explain the positive coefficient of this dummy
variable: that is. prices might increase as the participants gain credibility in the program and the government gains experience.
I explored this hypothesis in three ways. First, t looked ror a learning effect throughout the whole program, with linear and
concave functional forms of a variable which measured the order of sale, but found no statistical significance.Second. I created
a within.industry.order variable, the coeflicieni of which shows an economically smatl though marginally statistically significant
positive trend. Finally. Iran several specirications looking br year or quarter effects to identify possible economy-widetrends
that would be reflected in the price pattern. No significant effects were founiL with the exception of two quarters in the
recession year of 1986, which had signil'icant negative coefficients associated with them. These results are not shown but are
available upon request.
18TABLE V
LENGTHOF PRIVATIZATION PER COMPANY
Ordinaryleast squares regressions of the cross section of SOEs privatized in Mexico between 1983 and 1992. The
dependent variable is 'Privatization Q. the Govcrnment's Privatization Price (ONPP) adjusted by the percentage of
shares sold, plus Total Liabilities at time of privalization. divided by Total Assets of the Company at time of
privalization. 'Net Income/Sales' is the prc-privatizvion four-year average of Net Income over Total Sales;
•Contingent Labor LiabilitiesperWorker' is the average cost of firing a worker the day after privatization; 'Number
of Strikes' is the number of strikes in the live years before privatization: 'Government in Industry' is the
govcrnmenl's percentage share in the inductrys output before privatization; 'Non-control Package dummy' equals I
when the percentage sold does not give control to th buyer and 0 otherwise; '1988-1992 dummy' is equal to I when
the SOE was privatized between 1988 and 1992 and 0 otherwise: 'Total Length' is the total number of days between
the first recommendation to privatize and the privatization date: 'Public Length' is the number of days between the
first public announcement of privatization and the day of the announcement of the winner: 'Internal Length' is the
number of days between the first recommendation for privatization and the first public announcement of privatization;
'Number of bidders' is the number of different bidders involved in privatization; FDI allowed dummy' is equal to
I if the foreign investors are allowed in to participate in the sale; 'Cash-sale only dummy' is equal to I if the
privatizarion payment had to be made in cash. White (1980) corrected standard errors arc given in parentheses.
Depesidesu Variable. Privatizatlon Q






Net Income/Sales (1.8794 0.8999 • 0.8776
(0.2038) (0.2290) (0.2214)
Con:ingent Labor Liabilities -0.OIN • .0.0190'
per worker (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049)
Number olStrikes -0.1232 • -00883' -0.1173'
(0.0340) (0.0368) (0.0364)
Government in Industry 0.4688 0.4292 0.4864
(0.2034) (0.2399) (0.2205)
Non-control Package dummy -0.4146 • -0.3285 ' -0.3623
(0.1570) (0.1993) (0.1913)








Number of Bidders 0.0824 0.0974 0.0938
(0.0241) (0.0292) (0.0258)
Number of Rounds 0.0268 -0.0520 -0.0483
(OA)626) (00829) (00649)
Ft)l not allowed dummy -0.0775 -0.2621 -0.1500
(0.1897) (0.2134) (0.2020)
Cash-sale only dummy -0.1168 .0.1631 -0.1570
c°:.!.063)
Intercept 09923 0.5381 b 0.8426
(0.2430) (0.2651) (0.2826)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes
Number01 Observations 166 148 146
Adjusted R1 .4669 .4692 .457 I
Sniticatit at I percent.Significant at 5 percent.Significant at 10 percent.bureaucratic procedures. Additionally, this variable may hint at internal difficulties in placing the SUE
for sale, such as stakeholder opposition and management resistance to providing the evaluators with
financial information.'5 Typically, a detailed technical and financial study has been completed by the
time when the sale of the SUE is publicly announced. The financial statements thus produced bind the
government, which is liable for any discrepancies between this financial evaluation and the actual numbers
found once the firm is privatized. In regression III of Table V, the coefficient on internal length is
negative and significant. This number should be interpreted as the penalty for each additional day in
putting the company on the block. Evaluated at the mean value of PQ, a company would carry a discount
of an extra 6% if It took an additional 3 months of internal length.
To address the concern of possible endogeneity of the length measures, I implemented the two-stage
econometric procedure explained in section II. The results, shown in Appendix D, not only preserve the
statistically significant negative relation between length and PQ, but also give a larger coefficient. In the
case of internal length, the coefficient changes frotn -0.0004 to -0.0006, raising the average penalty for
3 extra months of internal length to 9% of PQ. evaluated at the mean.
Comparative performance before privatization
SUE performance deteriorates before privatization, and this may explain why a time-consuming process
depresses the price. Table VI contains financial and performance data of the to-be-privatized SOEs in
the t, 1.2. I.,. and t0 years before their privatization (where t0 is the year of privalizalion). As the day of
sale approaches, a decrease in profitability is clearly evident from this table. There is a 5 percentage
points decrease in the "net income to sales" ratio in years 1., and 1. Liquidity and market penetration fall
throughout the period, particularly in the last two years. As privatization approaches, the incentives of
the managers, workers, shareholders seem to collapse, severely affecting the company's activity and
profitability. Managers :ften take golden parathutes before resigning (it is fairly common for bidders
to stipulate no last minute management turnover. Similarly, workers try to extract more concessions in
the annual collective contract revisions before privatition. Current and even fixed assetsmay be lost
during the final weeks.t We cannot rule out the possibility that the observed deterioration results from
the same causes that account for lower performance of firms under financial distress, especially since
privatization very likely will change the operations, production, and running of the firm.
Although one might expect that the largest companies have longer internal length, the correlat'ion between total assets
and internal time is very small (onty 0.084).
To help prevent the loss or assets, at Ihe end ot the privatization program the government instituted a system by which
all heads oldepariments olan SOE had to provide periodic reports olthe assets under their controt. tn some cases, these reports
were put in a dala hank and bidders could access them electronically.
19Table VI





- 0.1089 - 0.0998 -0.0561 Operating Profit / Sales -0.1098
Net Income / Sales - 0.1968 - 0.1914 - 0.1421 - 0.1441
Sales / Total Assets 0.824 0.8357 0.9109 1.0636
Tot. Liabilitiesllot. Assets 0.4762 0.4688 0.4912 0.6223
Capacity Utilization 0.4987 0.5287 0.5690 0.5829
Labor Productivity Change . 0.0267 - 0.0673 - 0.02IS ----
Number of Observations 197 197 197 197
Given these tendencies for the whole sample, TaAe VII splits the to-be-privatized SOEs into two
groups, those with internal lime less than the mean (422 days), and those with internal time greater than
the mean." At t. both groups look very similar, with tI.. beluw-me'n group composed of smaller firms
registering larger losses. Performance shifts in the year before privatization (t.,) when the SOEs above
the mean (panel b) now record the highest losses, while the group with speedy privatizations (panel a)
improves its profitability and market penetration. The leverage of the former also increases, in contrast
to the lower debt levels of the below-mean group. Thus, those companies with longer internal times of
privacization suffer greater deterioration. These results point to a premium for speed.
V. B. Number of Bidders and Renegotiation Rounds
Auctiontheory predicts an increase in the premium p2id for an auctioned good as the number of bidders
increases. A total of 529 different companies, individuals, and unions were identified as bidders.' I
computed two indices: (i) number of bidders in the final sale round; and (ii) total number of different
bidders involved in all auction rounds. As shown in Table VIII, the mean number of bidders in the final
sale round is only 2.57. Almost 85% of the sample has no more than four different bidders, while 2.6%
has only I bidder but possibly multiple rounds. The vast majority of the companies were sold in the first
round, and only 14 companies needed more than three rounds.
17 Ifindnosignificant changeswhen using the median to split the groups.
uaAs expected, the name ofthe bidding group atoneis not enough to accurately determ,nc the real owner. It is common
tofind the same underlying shareholders bidding through differentcompanies or inassociation with someone else. Ii was
therefore necessary to go one leveldownatid screen the underlying structure of each registered bidder.
20Table VII
Panel a: Pre-privatization performance of firms below the mean
(mean values)





Net Income/Sales 0.1583 .0.1964 -0.1610 -0.1616
Sales / Total Assets 0.9942 0.9705 1.1274 1.2816
Tot. Liabilities/Tot.Assets 0.3940 0.4431 0.4728 0.5806
Number of Observations 67 67 67 67




Net Income / Sales - 0.2184 - 0.1858 .0.1249 - 0.1287
Sales / Total Assets 0.6708 0.6948 0.7104 0.8572
Tot. Liabilities/Tot.Assets 0.5731 0.4966 0.5082 0.6617
Number of Observations ii 71 71 71
PQ and the number of bidders in the auction may move together if they are both correlated to a third
set of variables that reflect the quality of the object for sale. Accordingly, the number of auction rounds
and PQ would be expected to move in opposite directions (i.e., valuable SOEs sell in fewer rounds and
attract both higher bids and more bidders). With this in mind. I use two methods to explain the influence
of competition in the auction on prices. First. I use the set of significant control variables determined in
previous section to control for the quality of the SOE.'9 The results in all regressions of Tables 4 and
5 show that for an SOE sold at the mean PQ. an additional bidder in the final round would have increased
the price by more than 15%. The bidder-premium elasticity is around 1.4 for final round bidders and
1.55 for a bidder in the process.
Theoretically, the possibility of renegotiation or multiple auction rounds could have an impact on the
strategies followed by the bidders, and therefore affect PQ. The coefficient on the effect of increased
number of rounds shows large standard errors, precluding clear conclusions (Table V). A variety of
reasons could explain why a company takes several rounds to sell, ranging from cases where there are
no bids, to those where renegotiation leads to extra rounds or where the highest bids are too close to
decide and participants are asked to bid again.
The existence of mutticoltinearity between thc SOE characteristics and the number of bidders and rounds could lower
the siguilicance level or the estimated coefficients. The correlation between bidders and rounds, and the rest of the controls is
nonetheless small, ranging From 0.02 in 037 in absolute values. There(ore. since correlations are not large and the procedure
iilI gives unbiased estimates, this probleiti is considered minor.
21Table VIII











number or different bidders
Maximum
I 6335 % 2.647 2.647 II
2 3.08 % 2.333 3058 10
3 7.24 % 2.625 4.312 9
4 2.71 % 3.000 4.000 7
5 1.36% 2.333 3.333 4
6 1.81 % 2.750 3.500 4
7 0.45 % 2.000 4.000 4
Total: 221 contracts 2.577 2.931 Ii
The second approach to explain the impact of auction competition on prices goes a step further
considering the possibility of endogeneity by following the two-stage procedure outlined in section II.
The results preserve the statistical significance of the coefficient on the number of bidders, though its
valueisreduced from 0.09 to around 0.06 (not shown). The coefficient on the number of rounds is still
positive and insignificant as in the one-stage regression. Overall, these numbers point to higher premia
as auction competition increases.
V. C. Auction Res:rjctjo,,s
Although alt privatizations in Mexico were first-price sealed-bid auctions, not all auction requirements
for each company were the same. Based oninternal documents and guidelines, Icoded 26auction
requirements, which can be classified into five categories: (I) foreign investment; (2) ownership or type-
of-bidder restrictions; (3) investment plan requirements; (4) contract/supply commitments; and (5)form
of payment. To determine the individual effects of these requirements, I ran several specifications of the
"Basic Regression" in Table IV including different sets of the dummies for requirements (not shown).°
TableIX presents the main results and separates the impact of requirements on PQ into two panels.
according to negative and positive effects.
20 Attention us paid in the estimation to hugh correlation between requiremenis. In two instances, I eliminatedrequirements
tram the equation to avoid rnulticolliiiearily. Tomal length (instead of internal lengii) is used in the restor thepaper as ii allows
us to keep the observations covering non-controlpackagesin the sample. n these 16 cases, no formal public announcement was
made in the newspapers, so there is ito clear boundary helwcen internal and public time.
22Foreign Direct Investment
Currentresearch has not estimated the influence of foreign investors in privatization. In our sample,
foreignersparticipated actively, winning in 6.3% of the auctions and forming winning joint ventureswith
domestic firms in another 9.1 % of all privatizatiOnS. Lower PQs are associated with those caseswhere
foreigners were not allowed to participate (see Table IX). Opening theauction to foreign bidders
increases competition and translates into higher premia for the government.
Ownershipperiod and type of bidders
Evidencealso shows that restrictions on period of ownership or on the allowed characteristics of
competing bidders lower PQ. Examples include the requirements of exclusive ownershipfor a minimum
number of years (usually 3 to 5). requirements on previous experience, or access to technology, andthe
existence of a pre-qualification round. All translate into lower PQs. Table IX shows that, evaluated at
the mean predicted PQ, cases with "Ownership/Bidder Restrictions" fetch ciose to 40% lower prices.
Investmentplansand contractcommitments
In64 cases of our sample. bidders were required to submit a fairly detailed investment plan along with
taicir bid. In another 6 cases, the government required the winner to meet all the previous contractsof
the SOE. The coefficients on both of these dummies are negative, but the standard error is too large to
draw conclusions.
Form ofpayment
In theory, the announcement of a minimum bid floor provides more information about the company and
increases the number of bidders by one, since bidders have to compete against this reservation price.2'
The estimated coefficient on this requirement (Table IX) gives no conclusive evidence. Finally, in 75
of the 221 privatization contracts, the authorities required the bidders to pay cash. Governments have
been imposing this requirement to try to avoid some sad experiences in other countries (notably Chile)
where an excess of debt in the payment structure led to defaults and to the government getting the firm
back. Aghion, Hart. and Moore (1992] suggest that cash-only auctions may preclude an interested bidder
from acquiring the company at its maximized value because the cost of financing a cash bid may be
significant, at least for the large transactions. In our sample, I find evidence along theselines with
a negative coefficient but no statistical significance. The coefficient implies close to a20% discount,
evaluated at the predicted mean P0.
In summary, the main effects of privatization auction requirements are negative for all conditions
21 This assumes that the government's threat nt keeping the company ii afl bids are below the minimum bidflooris
credible.
21 The authors suggest tlit these costs could he in the same range as those quantified by Rifler (19871 in the case of initial
public offerings (IPOs). In this study. Ruler quanlifies direct expenses and underpricIng costs between 21 and32% of the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 constraining participation(such as ownership restrictions, pre-qualilications, and preference given to
selectedgroups ofbidders) and forforms ofpayment and other requiremenis which reduce the flexibility
oftheformof the bid.
VI.PQ AND PRIOR RESTRUCTURING IN PRIVATIZATION
VI.A.Sotne Dos andDon'is inPriorRestructuring
As shown in Table II. restructuring costs prior to privatization are quite high averaging, 32% of the
nominal price of a privatization contract (BQ). The total cost associated to prior restructuring is not only
the direct cost of each measure undertaken, but also its direct impact on PQ and the increase in length
of time to privatize. which has been shown to impact premiums negatively. This raises the following
questions: Should the government engage in prior testructuring? If so, in what forms? Table X divides
the sample into two groups: (type a) those companies where restructuring did occur, and (type b) those
where it did not. The table also shows the results of a difference in means test for the mean PQ of these
two groups for each restructuring policy. If the data used to calculate PQ were all the available
information one had to evaluate the effect of prior restructuring actions --anot unreasonable assumption
for policy makers --twoof the clearest policy recommendations that would emerge would be to avoid
debt absorution or union contract restructuring (Table X). But, as we will show later, since these policies
are endogenous, drawing conclusions from Table X could lead to erroneous recommendations.
TABLE X
PRIOR RESTRUCTURING MEASURES
Meanvalues of 'Privalizalion Q of the groups of companies where: (a) the restructuring m as9re was taken' and ) the
rcstiucILi;ng measure was not taken.'PrivatizationQ' is equal to the 'Governmcnls Net Pnvatization Price (GPP) aljusted
by the percentage of shares sold, plus Total Liabilities at the tune of privatization. divided by TotalAssçts Orthe company at
the Lime of prtvatlzailon. The exact delinitions nt other variables can be found in AppendiS C. The difference between the
ineinPQ ot group a and the mean PQ UI group •b is shown in the third column. The last columflrepOrtS die resulting t.







(a) (b) t - slot.
CEO change 0.8679 (31) 0.6064 (146) 0.2615 1.75'
Management team change 0.6401 (26) 0.6543 (151) -0.0142 -0.09
Labor cuts 0.5472 (63) 0.7102 (114) .0.1630 1.48
UnIon contract restructurIng 0.0842 (14) 0.7010 (163) .0.6168 .2.74
Debt absorption 0.0621 (70) 0.7899 (132) -0.7278 -5.82'
ElTkkncy measures 0.5954 (39) 0.5239 (163) 0.0715 0.46
Investment measures 0.4967 (45) 0.5495 (157) -0.0528 .0.44
De-Investment measures 0.8288 (41) 0.4636 (161) 0.3652 2.89'
• Significant at I pcrceni;Signiticaiu at 5 percent:Significant at 10 percent
24The rest of this section studies the price effects of prior restructuring measures connected to
privatization. The access to detailed information allows to estimate the impact of restructuring actions on
net prices by two methods. The first considers policy actions as exogenous and estimates PQ regressions
of the same form as those in previous sections but now including restructuring policy variables. The
second, and more appropriate, approach captures the endogeneity of prior actions by implementing the
two-stage procedure outlined in section II to evaluate the final impact of prior restructuring on PQ.This
approach is appealing because it reveals the explanatory variables influencing the government's decision
to restructure an SOE. and enables us to determine some dos and don 'Is in prior restructuring by the
government.
Table Xl pulls together the individual restructuring measures described in Table X. The first column
of Table XI considers prior restructuring measures as exogenous and estimates directly the OLS White-
corrected regression. The second column uses the two-stage procedure to take account of the endogeneity
of prior restructuring policies. All F-tests on excluded instruments for each policy action allow us to
reject the null hypothesis and accept the significance of the instruments list or its correlationwith the
endogenous explanatory variable in each case. The results shown in Table XI are alsorobust to
instrument specifications. The remainder of the Section will show that taking account of the endogeneity
of restructuring policies reverses some of the results in Table X and in the one-stage (OLS)
specification.
VI.B. Management Changes
Two policies are examined: change of the CEO and changes of other members of the management
team.24In several of these cases, the prospectus given to the bidders emphasized management change
and the substitution of the "old guard" with a "young and dynamic" CEO or team of managers with the
task of getting the firm ready for privatization.
CEO Changes
In 33 instances in our sample. the CEO was fired before privatization. To illustrate the results we
obtain when we take account of endogeneily, Appendix E presents the specification used in the first stage
" The policies analyzed in this paper occur frequently, allowing us to perform econometric tests. Some or the asset
restructuring measures, such as the breaking up of companies, asset spin.otTs, and the packaging of severalSOEs together for
their sale were also explored in a similar way as the one outlined in the following pages. No significant effect on PQwas
observed for the use of these measures. López-de'Silanes (I 995a and I 995b)explorethe interaclion of regulation. de.regulatiOfl.
and privalizarion as well as their iesulls as reflected in post-privatization industry performance.
' In cases concerning the board of direclors. few involved creation of a board, and those involving changes in board
composition took place only in Iwo or three industries and were usually lied tO a reclassification of the companyin other sector
for ihc purpose or privatizition.
25probit to obtain the predictor of the CEO change dummy. As can be inferredfrom the table in
Appendix E, most CEOs were fired during the Salinas administration, were careerbureaucrats without
specific expertise in the business, and headed large firms. No CEO (nor any other directors) werefired
from SOEs when they had links with the union or with private shareholders. SOEs with third parties
supplying proprietory technology or distributing the company's products, or thoseSOEs that acted as
suppliers for other SOEs suffered fewer CEO changes.26 In the second stage panelof Appendix E, the
"CEO change' predictor is used as a generated instrument to measure the final impact of firing theCEO
on PQ. SOEs where the government changed the CEO have a substantially higher PQ.This result is
confirmed in T '1e Xl both in the one-stage and in th two-stage panels. Firing the CEO and putting a
privazizer in charge of cleaning up the company and getting it ready for sale asfast as possible is a
worthwhile strategy for increasing net prices.
Management Team Changes
The number of cases with management team changes, other than the CEO. totals 43. The two-stage
procedure uses a Tobit censored from below at 0 and from above at I, representing the rangebetween
o and 100 percent, to generate a predictor of the percent of manager cuts, other than the CEO. In the
second stage, il,e predictor produces a positive effect or. ?Q, bu, the standard error is too large to draw
firm conclusions (not shown in tables).27
The results indicate that firing management without sacking the CEO does not bring a premium.
Although it is likely that the ousting of a CEO is followed or accompanied by some firingof the
management team, it is the removal of the CEO that is associated with statistically significant higherPQs.
As will be shown below, firms where the old management team was left in place show higher occurrences
of efficiency or investment programs. In this sense, the positive effect associated with a change in
management could also be explained by the fact that the old CEOs are more expensive duringthe
transition because they spend more resources on efficiency programs.
VI. C. Labor
Previous sections of the paper reveal the importance of labor characteristics in determining PQ and this
section takes an additional look at the relevance of union variables in terms of the impact of labor
restructuring measures on net prices.
A similar procedure is loflowed For all restructuring policies but these regressions are not included in the paper.
26 Alternative specilications ol the instrument list show that companies with large losses and tower capacity utiliLatiOn were
targets For this measure.
Z7 In 36 ot the 45 cases where the CEO was tired, additional management learn changes took place. Since changes of CEO
and changes oF other members of the management learn are highly correlated (0.71). Table II shows the specification eactuding
management team changes other than the CEO. Other specifications arc available upon request.
26TABLE XI
PRIORRESTRUCTURING: DOSAND DON'TS
Probit. Tobit. and OLS regressions 01 the cross-section of SOEs privacized iii Mexico between 1983 and 1992. The lirsi
regression considers prior restructuring measures as exogenous and estimates directly the OLS regressions. White (1980)
corrected standard errors are 'iven in parentheses. For the endognous process: in the )'irss Stage, Probit and Eobits are used
to get the policy cdictors o the discrete and limited dependent variables. In the Second Stage,thedependent variable is
Privatizaiuon e value of the. GOVernment's Net Privatization Price (GNPP) adjusted by the percentage of shares sold, plus
Total Liabilities 'at the lime of r,vatization. divided by Total Assets of the SOE at the lime of privatuzation. In the second stage
instrumental variables are impiemented: the policy predictors, obtained from the first state, are used is generated instruments.




Independent variables — ____________________________
Net Income/Sales 0.7320 0.8175
(0.2196) (0.2437)
Contingent Labor .0.0075 -00073
Liabilities per worker (00032) (00039)
Number of Strikes -00893 -0.1415
(0.0377) (0.0668)
Government in Industry 0.3614 0.3469'
(0.2156) (0.2022)
Non-tontrol Package dummy -0.462, '0.3842 '
(0.1797) (0.1800)
Total Length -0.0005 • -0.0004'
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Number of Bidders 0.0854 • 0.0977
in Final Round (0.0306) (0.0366)
FDI allowed dummy 0.2343 0.1588
(0.3372) (0.3345)
Cash-only sale dummy '0.1509 -0.1315
(0.1269) (0.1648)
CEO change dummy 0.2768k 0.3129'
(0.1392, (0.1758)
Percentageof LaborCuts -0.2934 0.7441
(0.2654) (0.4484)
Union Contract Renegotialion -0.3365 0.0832
dummy (0.2606) (0.2876)
DebtAbsorbed / Equity -0.0368• -0.0015
(0.0110) (0.0473)
EfficiencyMeasures dummy -0.1428 -0.5841
(0.1813) (0.4302)
InvestmentMeasures dum'"v 0.0090 '0.420 I
(0.1718) (0.4937)




Industry Dummies yes yes
Number or Observations 132 132
Adjusted R1 .5258 .4731
F-stat. (overidentiticaliout) 0.6276
Significantat I percent. Signilicant ii 5 percent. Sigiiifacanc ii 10 percent.
F-Malistic (overidentitication) is diii Suggested by Basmautn 119601.Labor cuts
In89 out of 221 companies. there were labor reduui's in ihe two years before privatization. The one-
stage OLS panel of Table XI shows a negative insignificant effectofhigher percentages of personnel
reductions. The censored tobit used in the two-stage procedure (first stage not shown) reveals that larger
labor Cuts were made in the second phase of the privatization program (1988-1992). SOE workers with
temporary contracts were likely targets. Fewer cuts took place in SOEs without unions but interestingly,
even fewer workers were tired in SOEs with unions affiliated to "National Union 1.' which is thought
to be closely associated with the government. Finally. Companies whose workers obtained frequent pay
increases had :ower probability of labor cuts: the go rnment did not fire the most expensive workers.
Table Xl shows that reducing the labor force switches from having a negative impact on PQ to becoming
marginally valuable in terms of premiums when we account for endogeneity. An extra 5% reduction in
v.'orkers increases the net price of the SOE close to 6%, evaluated at the predicted mean PQ,
UnionContract Renegotiation
Althoughthe authorities undertook labor cuts prior to thy sale in 40% of the SOEs,onlyin 18 instances
did the government actually restructure the union contract. These cases include some of the worst
performing companies. The first column of Table XI u.msiders this policy as exogenous and includes
a dummy equal to one for those cases where union contract renegotiations took place. The coefficient
shows a negative though not significant effect of labor contract restructuring on PQ.
Using a probit as the first step in the two-stage procedure shows that the government restructured union
contracts with a higher probability in cases where the frequency of demands for wage increases was
greater. Most renegotiations involved firm-level unions that were considered active and enjoying very
favorable collective contracts. In the second-stage regression in Table Xl the coefficient of labor contract
renegotiations changes sign showing in a positive but not statistically significant effect on PQ. This
specification contradicts the apparent association of mis policy with lower PQs found in the simple means
test and in the exogenous regression in the first column o1 Table Xl.
VI.D.DebtAbsorption
The results of the OLS regression in Table Xl show a statistically significant negative impact of debt
absorption on PQ. making debt write-offs the worst prior-restructuring policy to adopt in terms of premia
generated. The first-stage tobit for debt absorption shows that SOEs with lower market penetration and
in "depressed" industries were likely targets for debt restructuring (not shown). When the estimated
value of the amount of debt absorption over total equity is used as a generated instrument in the PQ
equation in Table Xl. the results show that debt absorption by the government does not have a significant
impact on PQ. challenging the benefit of this policy for generating larger premiums.
27VI.E. Efficiency measures
In39 cases, the government undertook specific directives or programs aimed at improving performance
and operations efficiency, or at increasing management's flexibility to make financial and production
decisions.15 SOEs' management learns argued thai efficiency measures would solve the main problems
of the firm, improve performance, and generate a higher privacization net price. The results do not
support these claims. When comparing groups with and without efficiency programs, the opposite
behavior is observed. In the two years prior to privatization: (i) the operating-income-to-sales ratio
improved for those SOEs without efficiency measures and dropped for those with a program; and (ii)
capacity utilization fell 4.5% for those firms without a program, and fell 7.73% for those with one.
The exogenous PQ regression in Table Xl produces a negative though insignificant coefficient for the
dummy which measures the use of such programs. The first stage of a probit shows that most of these
programs took place in industries with large to'al debt to assets ratios and in sectors where the
government represented a large share of the domestic supply. Companies with obsolete equipment and
outdated technology were not targets of these measures A higher percentage of old bureaucratic
managers is positively associated with the probabili1 of undertaking these measures. The second-stage
PQ regression in Table Xl confirms the exogenous OLS result with a larger negative effect on PQ. but
still without statistical significance. These results allow us to conclude that performance enhancement
measures by the existing CEO and management team before privatization do not generate higher premia.
VI.F.Investment and De-In vestment
Thegovernment undertook an investment program in 45 to-be-privatized SOEs.1' Using a dummy
equal to one in the case of such a program in the exogenous PQ regression in Table XI to test for the
impact of this measure results in a non-significant positive coefficient. The sign is reversed when I
account for endogeneity. The first-stage probit finds that SOEs that had U,en experiencing hiier
production growth rates or had high capital utilization ratios were less likely candidates for investment
measures. SOEs with investment programs typically had small market shares and high debt to asset
ratios. Most of these programs were used during the first years of privatization when the restructuring
of SOEs still played a large role in the overall government strategy. In the second stage regression in
Table XI, using the generated instrument produces a large negative effect on PQ. As in the case of
efficiency programs, SOEs with investment programs show no better performance than those without.
It can thus be concluded that improvements in efficiency are dubious at best, and that the amount invested
It is interesting to observe that in the 23 Cases where the government gave more flexibility to the existing management,
the CEO was not fired. The CEO was fired in only 3 of the 39 cases with a performance improvement program. This seems
to suggest a degree or substitutability of these iwo actions.
29 Unfortunately, reliable data on capital expenditure rrom the financial statements was not available for a largepan of the
sample.
28by the government is not reflected in higher PQs. especially when we remember thatthe resources used
would have remained in the government's pocket.
Finally, given the lack of success of investment programs and performance improvement measures,it
seems logical to question the effect on prices of the opposite action, de-investment. In 41 SOEs,the
govermnent either froze nonessential capital expenditure. stopped major investment programs, ordeclared
that only emergency investments would take place. The test of means in Table X and the exogenous
regressions (not shown) indicate the positive results of these measures. This group of SOEshad high
market pen..tration and included several cases where he government had minority holdings. The two-
stage procedure in Table Xl shows a coefficient close to zero but thestandard error is large. De-
investing is a better strategy than investing before privatization in order to achieve higher premia. even
without taking into account national savings.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the determinants of privatization .ices using company level analysis of a cross-
section of all privatized SOEs in Mexico. The importance of company and industry characteristics and
of stakeholders is assessed: expensive and active unions and non-control privatization packages reduce
net prices (PQs).SOEs'financial and operating performance measures deteriorate as the day of
privatization approaches, explaining the negative relation between the time to put the company onthe
block and net prices. The speed of privatization consistently increases the premiums paid. The positive
impact of increased competition in the auction, and the .egative effects of specific auction requirements,
emphasize the importance of widespread participation and the need to eliminate restrictions that hinder
bidder involvement.
These findings open up an area of research on government policies prior to and associated with the sale
of state-owned enterprises. This paper shows that direct costs of prior restructuring policies are quite
substantial, amounting to an average of 30% of the sale price. Additionally, restructuring measures such
as efficiency and investment programs slow privatization. Delays in privatization come at a substandal
cost, particularly when subsidies poured on SOEs can quickly add up to outweigh privatization revenues.
Finally, the analysis of the impact on net prices of restructuring measures gives us some guidelines on
the dos and don'ts in restructuring prior to privatization. Tirole (1991) and Kikeri et al. [1992) suggest
extensive government action in restructuring and careful selection of firms and their time of sale. My
results do not support this view. Some of the most commonly advocated intervention measures --
including absorbing debt, implemenhing efficiency programs, and increasing the decision power ofthe
existing management team -- do not lead to higher premia. In contrast, policies that could be regarded
as eliminating barriers to the sale, such as firing the CEO and down-sizing the labor force, do increase
PQs. The empirical estimates in this paper point to a premium for speed and restructuring measures that































































































































































































The Mechanism of Privatizationin Mexico
Thegeneral mechanism of the process followedin each case may be divided into two time frames:
In,ernol time, from the date of the first memo within the governmentmentioning privatization of an SOE
until the first public announcement of the sale; and Public time, extendingfrom the date of the first public
announcement until the date of the announcement of the buyer.
I-Internal time
I) Recommendation and proposal of privatizatiOn bythe ministry or coordinating agency in charge of
the company.
2) Approval by the "Interministerial Commissionof Expenditure and Funding" (CIGF). This
commission determines the method: liquidation, merger, transfer, or privatization.
3) In the cases of privatization. the Secretariat of Programmingand Budget (SPP) sends an official
communication to mark the beginning of the process.
4) Appointmel&t of one of the 18 Mexican commercial..anks or of Nacional Financiera as sales agent.
The agent bankand the Office of Privatization work together todetermine the terms of the aqclion
as well as other required details in order to produceinformation documents in each case.
Il-Public time
S) A public announcement calls for an auction, providesthe calendar and the general guidelines.
6) Potential bidders request information. A descriptive summaryof the company is provided.
7) A company prospectus with detailed information is given tobidders who make a deposit. ranging
between I and close to 10% of the final sale price as calculated here.A letter of confidentiality is
also required.
8) Bidders can ask additional questions and are invited tovisit the company.
9) The agent bank (and possibly other domestic or foreignconsultants) prepare a valuation which
incorporates a financial and technical assessment of the companyunder different methodologies. The
result provides a minimum reference price (MR.P) which is not disclosed tothe bidders. This serves
as an internal reference value by which to evaluate the offers.
10) Bids are submitted to the agent bank which proceeds to analyzethem in terms of price, labor, and
investment program proposals. A recommendation to the FinanceSecretariat is made.
It) Approval of privatization is provided by the Office ofPrivalization. In a case where all bids are
below the MRP or there is only I bid, the case is forwarded to theCIGF for a decision.
12) In a case of rejection, the company will be auctioned againand the necessary steps under Public time
will be followed. On average, after several unsuccessful auction rounds,direct negotiations with
bidders are undertaken.
13) The Finance Secretariat issues a final resolution and aPrivatization Contract or sale contract is
signed. Payment is typically directed to the Federal Treasury, orin a few cases to Nacional
Financicra when this institution was the holder of the shares.
3'Appendix B
Summary Statistics or Variables
Summarystatistics for thesampleor 22! Privatization Contracts nlcontpanks prirslizcd in Mexico between 1983 and June 1992.
Variable Obs. Mean Median Sid. Dcv. MinimumI Maaimwn
Privatizahon Q 202 0.3378 06172 0.7915 -3.4600 4.0563
Net Incomel Sales (percent) 191 -0.1292 -0.0099 03909 -2.9306 0.7332
Operating Incotne I Sale- percent) 191 -00596 0.047 0.3628 .1.7850 0.7534
Contingent Labor Liabilities
per Wotker (milliont ol pesot per
worker)
199 16.3365 15.0347 14.4260 0 130.4428
Numiter of Strikes 185 0.9838 0 1.4835 0 II
Government inIndustry(percent) 22! 0.4626 0.5 0.3545 0.01 I
C.,wth in Production (percent) 195 -0.0163 -0.0153 0.3183 -l 1.1029
Capacity Utilization (perctflt) 205 0.5243 0.51 0.2735 0 1.125
Cot' sany Market Share (percent) 220 01520 0.05 0.2336 0
Number 01 Bidders 220 2.9318 3 1.9397 I
Number of Bidders Final Round 220 2.5773 2 1.7849 I II
Total Debt over Total AssetS 203 0.4587 0.3420 0.3651 0 22740
Number of Employees 210 1721.919 472 5253.337 0 49203
Internal Time (days) 184 4221717 268 385.7993 II
Public Time(days) lii 302.8245 211 253.6222 Ii
Total Time(days) 215 719.5767 606 441.7985 49
Numbci ofAuction Rounds 221 1.6290 I 1.0981 I 7
32Appendix C
Definition or Variables
Agent bank dununlea: A set of 9 dummy variables one for each of thefinancial institutions in charge iii tire privatizatton process of a company.
Each dummy is equal toif that pariicular agent was responsible far that company, and 0 irilurwive.
Announced nslnlmum bid floor: Dummy variable equal to I if tire government announced aminimum hid floor as part of the auction rules, and
0 otherwise.
Backward technology: Dummy variable equal rim I if the valuator or arty documentdescribed time techitimlogy ol mIte cnmpany as outdated or
backward, and 0 otherwise.
Buyers must meet all company contracts: Dumnmy variable equal to
I if the government required as part ill rite auction rules that the buyers meet
all company contracts nade prior to privatization. and 0 ntherwite.
Bureaucrat manager: Dummy variable equal to I if the manager (or CEO) before privamization wasa bureaucrat with lest than three years on site
job, and 0 otherwise.
Caah/lnstalbnenta achedule provided: Dummy variable equal to I if the government announced as panof the auction rules a determined
cath!it%stallnlent payment schedule.
Capacity utilization: The last two-year average of capacity utilization before privalizasion.
CEO change: Dummy variable equal to I if the CEO wat fired in the two years prior to privatizatton.and 0 otherwise.
Distribution of products contract: Dummy variable equal to I if the company had acommercialization contract with a third party, and 0 otherwise.
Company market abate: The average market share of the SOE during the three-year periodbefore privatizalon.
Contingent labor lIabIlIties per worker: The average cost of firing a worker the day
after privatixation. according to the collective union contract.
DebllEqulty swap: Dummy variable equal to I if the government announced before theauction that it would allow the use of a debt (or equity awap
mechanism, and 0 otherwise.
Debt Abaorbed I EquIty: Debt absorption undertaken by the government before privatization. divided by
total tharehoideru' equity at the time of
privatization.
De-Inveatanent meaaurea: Dummy variable equal to I if the company underwent a de.investment measure (asoutlined in the test) withims the two
years prior to peivatization. and 0 otherwise.
Depressed market: Dummy variable equal to I if the valuator or any document described at depressedthe markem of the company, and 0 otherwise.
Efficiency meaaurea: Dummy variable equal to I if the company underwent an efficiency improvement programin the two years prior to
privatiaation. and 0 otherwise.
Excess workers: Dummy variable equal to I if the valuator or any document described the company as having escetalabor relative to industry
standards, and 0 otherwise.
Eitperienced bureaucrat manager: Dummy variable equal to I if the manager (or CEO) before privamizationwas an experienced bureaucrat with
over three years on the job, and 0 otherwise.
Finn-level union: Dummy variable eqil to I if the union compris i workers only from that SOE. and 0otherwise.
Foreign Inveataasent not allowed: Dummy variable equal to I if the Law of Foreign Direct investmentdid not allow EDI in that industry, and 0
otherwise.
Foreign manager: Dummy variable equal to I if the manager (or CEO) L...,re privatization was a foreigner.and 0 otherwise.
GNPP: Government's Net Privalization Price. The net present value of the nominal price of sale as registeredin the sale contract aubmracting all
restructuring coats, the cost of government commitments at the time of sale, and all other adjustmentsmade to the sate contract.
Government as a partner: Dummy variable equal to I if the government remained as a shareholder in the companyafter privatization. and 0
otherwise.
Government In Induatry: The government's percentage participation in domestic production.
Growth In production: The four-year geometric average of production growth before privatitatton.
Growth In sales rate: The four-year geometric average of sales growth before privatixatton.
Individual contract: Dummy variable equal to I if the company did not have a collective union contract so thateach employees signed an individual
employment contract, and 0 otherwise.
Investment measures: Dummy variable equal to I if the copspany had an investment program within the two yearsprior to privatization. and (I
otherwise.
Investment plan at the time of bid: Dummy variable equal to I if the government required as pao of the
auction that bidders submit an investment
plan at the time of the bid, and 0 otherwise.
Industry order: The number of companies privatized before the company in she same 3 digit sic. industrycode.
Induatry-level union: Dummy variable equal to I if the workers of the company belonged to aunion for the whole induttrSt. and 0 otherwise.
Internal length: The number of days between tIre first recommendation for privarixation and the first publicannouncement of privatization.
Labor contract renegotiatIon: Dummy variable equal to Iif the labor contract was renegotiated in the two years prior to privatiration. and 0
otherwise.
33Large fringe benefits: Dummy variable equal to I It the collective union contract gave large fringe benefits so workers relative to indusary
standards, and 0 otherwise.
Manager frani labor union: Dummy variable equal to I lithe ttunager (or CEOi before privatiaation was connected or belonged to the union of
the company, end 0 otherwise.
Minlatry In charge: A set of 6 dummy variables. one llsr each of the nsinolraes under which the company was classified before privatisation. Each
dummy is equal io I if that ministry was responsible for that c.anipan. and U otherwise.
National unions "a": Dummy variable equal to I if the w,irkeis iii he company belonged to national union a not specific to an industry, and0
otherwise.
Net Income / Salea: The four-year average of Net Income over Total Saks betare privatization.
No union amliatlon: Dummy variable equal so I ii the workers of the company had no union affiliation, and 0 otherwise.
Non'coota'ol package: Dummy variable equal to I if rIse percentage sold does not give contrtil so the buyer, and 0 otherwise.
Non4radeabhe good: Dummy variable equal to I if the main product or the company is a non-tradeable good, and 0 otherwise.
Number of auction rounda: The number of privasization sale rounds.
Number or final round bidders: The number of different bidders in she final auction round.
Number of bidden: The number of different bidders in all auction rounds.
Number of naUsea: The nsarnber of strikes esperienced by the SOE in the five years before privatizasion.
ObaolJle equIpment: Daanmy variable equal to I if the valuator or any document described the machinery of the company as obsolete, and 0
otherwise.
Operating Income I Saks: The four-year average of Operating Income saver Total Saks before privatization.
Order of ask: The number of companies privatized hefore the company in the whole process.
Ownerahlplbldder Restrictions: Dummy variable equal to I if ihere were auction requirements which restricted ownership for a minimum number
of years or did not allow certain type of biddera to parsicapate.
Percentage of labor cuta: Percentage of the labor force lircd isa the Iwsa yea nrio' to peivatization.
Percentage of management team fired: Percentage of the niasiafeitaesit team lired (besides the CEO) in she two years prior to privatizasion.
Percentage sold: The percentage of shares sold in privatitasisan.
Private manager: Dummy variable equal to I if the nsanager (or CEO) before prisasizauion was a private sector manager, and 0 otherwise.
Prlvatlaatlon Q: Government's Net Privasiz.ssion Price adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold ptus total liabilities at die time of
privatiastion. divided by the total assets of the company at the time of privalieation.
Price controLs: Dummy variable equal to I it the main product of the company was subject of price controls, and 0 otherwise.
Preference to ksaldera: Dummy variable equal to I if insiders were given special preferences in the auction process as pars of the company's
bylaws.
Product requIring concession: Dummy variable equal so I if the product m. the company required government concession, and 0 otherwise.
Publk length: The number of days between the first public announcement of privasizasion and the privatization date.
Requlre4 Deposit / Assets: The required deposit to be allowed so enter the auction as a percentage of coral assets of the company as thetUne of
privasization.
Restricted ownership period: Dummy variable equal to I if the goveenmea.. required as pars of the auction rules that the buyers should have
eaclusive ownership for a minimum number of years (usually 3 to 5) without allowing resale, and 0 otherwise.
Sale contract models gIven to bidden: Dummy variable equal so I if the g'wernmenr gave the bidders sale contract models before the bid date.
and 0 otherwise.
Sale Costa I Inventorlea: Saks Costs over total inventories at the time of privatizshlon.
Shareholder manager: Dummy variable equal so I if the manager (or CEO) before privarizarion was a shareholder, and 0 otherwise.
Shutdown: Dummy variable equal to I if the government shut down the company before privasizatlon, and 0 otherwise.
Supplkr SOE: Dummy variable equal so I if before privasizasion. she company acted mainly as a supplier for other SOEa, and 0 otherwise.
Technology contract wish third party: Dummy variable equal to I if the company had a technology contract with a third party, and 0 otherwise.
Temporary labor contracts: Dummy variable equal so I if the company had only temporary contracts signed with ins workers, and 0 otherwIse.
Total length: The total number of days between the tirst recommendation so privatize and the privasizahion date.
Union I Non-union workers: Number of unionized waarkers over number of nonunionized workers in the company at the time of privatization.
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